Spaces Between: Towards Depolarized Readings of \u3ci\u3eIncidents in the Life of a Slave Girl\u3c/i\u3e by Schneider, Bethany Suzanne
Oberlin 
Digital Commons at Oberlin 
Honors Papers Student Work 
1993 
Spaces Between: Towards Depolarized Readings of Incidents in 
the Life of a Slave Girl 
Bethany Suzanne Schneider 
Oberlin College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors 
 Part of the English Language and Literature Commons 
Repository Citation 
Schneider, Bethany Suzanne, "Spaces Between: Towards Depolarized Readings of Incidents in the Life of 
a Slave Girl" (1993). Honors Papers. 559. 
https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors/559 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Digital Commons at Oberlin. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Honors Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Oberlin. For 




Spaces Between: Towards Depolarized Readings 
of Incidents in the Life of A Slave Girl 
Bethany Schneider 




BIG thanks to Sandy -- you rock, as in "on this rock 
I will build my [thesis]." Thanks to Pat, for 
honoring two whole semesters of me with patience 
and humor, to David for four years of patience and 
humor, and to Scott and American Romanticism 
for listening. Beck! Thanks for sending the space 
between sanity and insanity daily over the vax. 
Thanks to Laurel and Cindy for the vacation in the 
Southern Mists, Paul and Nina for the pink heart, 
Mom and Dad, you know, for everything. Thanks 
to Elena, Kate, Zoe, Walter, Eiren, Jen, Emily, 
Molly, Doug, Matt. .. and Paige, for the purple 
ribbon. I dedicate this paper to Holly. Without you 
I never would have made it through in one piece. 
) 
) 
They seem to satisfy their consciences with the doctrine 
that God created the Africans to be slaves. What a libel 
upon the heavenly Father, who "made of one blood all 
nations of men!" And then who are Mricans? Who can 
measure the amount of Anglo-Saxon blood coursing in 
the veins of American slaves? 
-- Harriet Jacobs 
Incidents in The Life of a Slave Girl 
) 
) 
Harriet Jacobs'1 Incidents in the Life of A Slave Girl is a text which, 
written in a culture divided between polarities2 of race and gender, has 
continued in the 130 years of its reception to traverse a landscape of mutably 
yet continually divided racisms and sexisms, changeably yet continually 
cloven raced and gendered identities. The text itself, due to the legally and 
socially constructed polar ontologies of race and gender in 19th century 
America, is tom between what can be said and what can't, what is true and 
what is false, what is black and what is white. The "tears" manifest 
themselves on all levels, from the text's ambiguous manipulation of the 
slave narrative genre and of the conventions of sentimentality, down to 
paradoxical statements housed in a single sentence. Readings of Incidents 
have also been tom. From acceptance at "face value," that is, that Jacobs was 
1 Jacobs wrote Incidents under a pseudonym, "Linda Brent," and many writers choose to 
make a distinction between the writer and the narrative character. I recognize and find 
very interesting the importance of this distinction, and see it as pertinent to the ideas I 
will set out in this paper. However, for the sake of clarity, I have chosen to refer only 
to "Harriet Jacobs" throughout. 
2There has been a great deal of recent theorizing about institutionalized polarities. 
Although lesbian and gay theories have very different grounds and goals than race 
theories, Judith Butler's discussion of how systems of polarity work has been the most 
helpful to my understanding. She describes how heterosexuality, in setting itself up as 
the norm and the origin, demands the existence of homosexuality as an opposite and a 
derivative: "The origin requires its derivations in order to affirm itself as an origin, 
for origins only make sense to the extent that they are differentiated from that which 
they produce as derivatives" (Butler, p 22). A polarity, in other words, relies on an 
either/or system of extremes and oppositions and denies the possibility or existence of 
any sort of both/and middle ground. Diana Fuss, writing about lesbian and gay theory, 
speaks directly to the question of the fate of identities which lie between poles of 
understanding: "Where exactly, in this borderline sexual economy, does the one identity 
leave off and the other begin? And what gets left out of the inside/outside, 
heterosexuaVhomosexual opposition, an opposition which could at least plausibly be said 
to secure its seemingly inviolable dialectical structure only by assimilating and 
internalizing other sexualities (bisexuality, transvestism, trassexualism ... ) to its own 
rigid polar logic?" (Fuss, 2). Polarized understandings, in other words, make 
"invisible," or even negate, spaces between. 
) 
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the black fugitive slave she claimed to be, to readings which understood it as a 
fiction by a white woman, to its recent recovery and revalorization as an 
"authentic" slave narrative, the text has been read in radically contradictory 
ways. This paper will be an examination of how the rendings and renderings 
in the text, and the rendings and renderings of the text as it has been read, 
suggest in the midst of their divisions spaces between polarities which have 
the potential to reveal those polarities' construction.3 The text's many 
slippages between categorical understandings, in other words, suggest possible 
sites not of synthesis, but of ranges of understanding. 
Antebellum American culture was, as contemporary American culture 
still is, built on dualistic understandings supported by law and language. 
"Race" has long been a cornerstone of this belief system for white Europeans 
and Americans, with "black" and "white" occupying opposite ends of the 
chain of being. Thus in 1862, Abraham Lincoln told a group of black leaders 
that "You and we are different races. We have between us a broader 
difference than exists between any other two races" (Gates, 3). Never mind 
that these two "races," divided by the broadest distance Lincoln could 
imagine, mingled and mingled easily, mostly through the rape of slave 
3A very interesting discussion of the "difference between" between and among may be 
found in the American Heritage Dictionary. "Between is the only possible choice when 
only two entities are involved: between (never among) good and evil. .. When more than 
two entities are involved, the choice of between or among depends on the intended 
meaning. Among is used to indicate that an entity has been chosen from the members of a 
group: the first among (not between) equals. . . Among is also used to indicate a relation 
of inclusion in a group ... Between, on the other hand, is used to indicate the area 
bounded by several points: We have narrowed the search to the area between (not 
among) Philadelphia, Scranton, and New York. In other cases either between or among 
may be used; ... one may say either that the boy was lost among the trees ("in the area 
of the trees") or between the trees (in which case we infer that the trees hid the boy 
from sight)." This range of meaning, in which between encompasses a space in the 
middle of two polarities, circumscribes uncharted territory, and implies invisibility, 




women by slave owners, to the point where Jacobs could ask the question, 
"who can measure the amount of Anglo-Saxon blood coursing in the veins of 
American slaves" (Jacobs,43)? As Jacobs elsewhere points out, "No matter 
whether the slave girl be as black as ebony or as fair as her mistress, in either 
case, there is no shadow of law to protect her from insult, from violence, or 
even from death" (Jacobs, 27). In other words, it is the law which polarizes 
the understanding of race, not race which dictates the law. The words black 
and white, when applied to race, thus become not descriptions of actual 
appearance, but justifying metaphors for a system of legally sanctioned social 
tyranny. Categorical language, which supports and naturalizes social and 
legal constructions by eliding spectra of color and identity into polarized 
definitions of black/white,4 thus creates an official ontology of the visible and 
the understandable, which is an ontology of polarity. This ontology must, in 
order to preserve its absolute bifurcation, "assimilate and internalize [other 
permutations of 'race'] ... "to its own rigid polar logic," as Fuss says of 
sexuality (Fuss, 2). Words and definitions thus function both to buttress legal 
interdictions, in this case the antebellum laws surrounding race, and as 
interdictions themselves, prohibit in their polarity the visibility of spaces 
between and sanction the constant reconstruction of dichotomized 
4Look at how Good/Evil, or Good vs. Evil, is written on the page. Something is needed to 
symbolize the words' polarity~ This function is served by the versus symbol, or the 
virgule, which in French means comma, but which in English means, according to the 
dictionary, "the diagonal mark used to separate alternatives." The fact that something 
must exist between two words in order to establish their polarity, creates an image on 
the page not of two things, but of three: the two words, and a third thing that both unites 
them and defines them over against one another. The virgule, I would argue, is the 
physical reminder that there are spectra of meaning and colors between polar 
oppositions such as good/evil and black/white, which fluidly connect them and thereby 
undercut the logic which sets them in opposition. But the virgule is only a vestige, the 
condensation of variety into a diagonal mark which signifies and ossifies polarity. But 
as a vestige, this simple denotation destabilizes that opposition, simply because of its 
necessity. The need for the virgule suggests the space between. 
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understandings. Thus interdicted, the spaces between polarities are unsayable 
and invisible. 
Invisibility is an extremely important aspect of spaces between. A 
spectrum of skin coloration may appear physically before the eyes, but the 
physical evidence that "race" is not a biological absolute was not and still isn't 
recognized or enacted culturally. Because interdicted into white/black poles, 
the racial spectrum was in fact conceptually invisible. Equally conceptually 
invisible were the varieties of intelligence, beauty, sexual appetite, etc., which 
were also polarized and assigned, depending on their desirability, to either 
"white" or "black." In antebellum America, the maintenance of these 
invisibilities under the rubric of the original black/white polarity was of 
utmost importance to the preservation of the metaphor of "race" which 
justified slavery. Not only voiced in the slave-states, polarizing justifications 
for slavery can be found in the works of European philosophers whose works 
were influential to or at least symptomatic of the white antebellum American 
mood.5 In 1753 the Scottish philosopher David Hume wrote: "I am apt to 
suspect the negroes ... to be naturally inferior to the whites .... Such uniform 
and constant difference could not happen ... if nature had not made an 
original distinction betwixt these breeds of men" (Gates, 10). Race, 
determined by skin color and features, is made immutable (one is white or 
"negroe") and a sign of "natural" status. Harriet Jacobs takes up this sort of 
logic and suggests, in doing so, the space between the poles of superior and 
inferior which reveals the way in which the enactment and reification of 
polar understandings is constructed by the slave system itself: "I admit the 
black man is inferior. But what is it that makes him so? It is the ignorance in 
5Henry Louis Gates, Jr. uses Hume and other European philosophers in his discussion of 
New World racism in his introduction to "Race," Writing and Difference. 
) 
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which white men compel him to live; it is the torturing whip that lashes 
manhood out of him; it is the fierce bloodhounds of the South, and the 
scarcely less cruel human bloodhounds of the north, who enforce the 
Fugitive Slave Law. They do the work" Gacobs, 44). By saying "inferiority" is 
a result of the laws of nature, Hume naturalizes a polarized understanding of 
race. Jacobs, by stating very clearly that "inferiority" is the result of the 
violent enactment of the laws of the state, suggests the range between 
"inferiority" and "superiority" which is the result of the social and legal 
subjugation of "black" Americans under "white" Americans. In Hume's 
formulation, cause and effect are made invisible through his naturalization 
of the results of subjugation into an understanding of "white" as superior, 
and "negroe" as inferior.6 
6Hume goes on to explain how "In Jamaica, indeed they talk of one negroe as a man of 
parts and learning [Francis Williams, the Cambridge-educated poet who wrote verse in 
Latin]; but 'tis likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments, like a parrot, 
who speaks a few words plainly" (Gates, 10). It is very interesting that Hume comes 
round to saying that any achievements "negroes" may have are simple "parrotings" of the 
achievements of their white "superiors." Although I won't be using him directly, Homi 
Bhabha's theories of colonial mimicry very definitely "ghost" this paper. Perhaps most 
important to my thinking has been his analysis of the never-closeable space between 
mimed and mimic, self and other. English colonials in India had a "desire for a reformed, 
recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite. 
Which is to say that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in 
order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its 
difference" (126). This is related very importantly to Diana Fuss' understanding of the 
function of the homosexual Other in the homo/hetero polarity, in which homosexuality 
(analogous to but not the same as Bhabha's colonized mimic) "becomes the excluded; it 
stands in for, paradoxically, that which stands without. But the binary structure of 
sexual orientation, fundamentally a structure of exclusion and exteriorization, 
nonetheless constructs that exclusion by prominently including the contaminated other 
in its oppositional logic. The homo in relation to the hetero, much like the feminine in 
relation to the masculine, operates as an indispensable interior exclusion -- an outside 
which is inside interiority making the articulation of the latter possible, a 
transgression of the border which is necessary to constitute the border as such" (Fuss, 
3). The colonial and the colonized, the heterosexual and the homosexual, constitute 
polarities in which the obsessive articulation of "what is different" binds the two poles 
in an inextricable and incestuous relation in which mimicry plays an enormous role. 
But the whole comic tragedy is that mimicry can never become same. The closer it gets 
the more farcical the mimicry becomes, because to close the gap would be to destroy the 
polarity, as I have suggested by contrasting Hume's and Jacob's understandings of the 
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If spaces between are spectra of color and identity made invisible by 
their constant rupture and elision into polarized understandings, then the 
inability to see spaces between can be understood as a linguistically and legally 
institutionalized blind spot. Just as the side-mirror in a car can erase a truck, 
showing instead a stretch of smooth highway, so the antebellum 
understanding of race served to erase the link which connects "black" to 
"white." In this case, however, the blind spot is not that which can't be 
physically seen with the eye, but the rift legal and linguistic polarizing 
interdictions create in the smooth spectrum which the eye perceives. 
"Miscegenation" or, according to the American Heritage Dictionary, 
"The interbreeding of what are presumed to be distinct human races," was 
one of the factors most unsettling to the constant maintenance of the blind 
spot and the resulting repolarization of "race" in America. For example, 
Karen Sanchez-Eppler describes the problem which miscegenation created for 
the antebellum understanding of race, and the answer language provided: 
"The less easily race can be read from his or her flesh, the more clearly the 
white man's repeated penetrations of the black body are imprinted there. The 
quadroon'S one-fourth blackness represents two generations of miscegenating 
intercourse, the octoroon's three -- their numerical names attesting to 
society's desire to keep track of an ever less visible black ancestry even at the 
cost of counting the generations of institutionalized sexual exploitation" (40). 
"inferiority" of the slave. Bhabha tells how. British colonials wanted n'a class of 
interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern -- a class of persons Indian 
in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect' -- in 
other words, a mimic man raised 'through our English school. .. to form a corps of 
translators .. .' He [the mimic man] is the effect of a flawed colonial mimesis, in which 
to be Anglicized is emphatically not to be English" (Bhabha, 128). A metaphor which 
has helped me envision this is Xeno's paradox, which points out that because space is 
infinitely divisible in half, then objects should never meet, because space can never be 
fully spanned. 
Schneider, 7 
"Numerical names" insured that a pale "black" body remain on the "black" 
side of the racial dichotomy, thus making conceptually invisible the spectrum 
of color. 
The polarity of race was inscribed not only into language, but into law. 
In the antebellum South, a law dating to a 1662 Virginia statute insured that 
light skinned "blacks" would remain safely enslaved, providing that children 
"got by an Englishman upon a Negro woman shall be bond or free according 
to the condition of the mother" (Higgenbotham, 44). The question 
miscegenation raised regarding race classification was thus answered, since 
the vast majority of "mulattos" were the result of the rape of slave women by 
white men. After emancipation this answer was no longer possible, and 
numerical laws were drafted, defining race based on fractions: "In 1879 
Virginia defined a Negro as possessing one-fourth or more of Negro blood. 
By 1910 ... the law was amended to include as Negroes all who had one-
sixteenth or more Negro blood ... the law was amended -- in 1930 -- to read 
that every person in whom there is 'ascertainable any Negro blood shall be 
deemed and taken to be a colored person'" (Franklin, 34).7 Thus, the space 
between racial polarities was made invisible through linguistic and legal 
interdiction, resulting in a collective cultural blind spot which refused and 
7Higgenbotham notes that these attitudes surrounding the fear of miscegenation and the 
need to define race are not by any means antique, "for it was not until 1967 that the 
United States Supreme Court finally declared unconstitutional those statutes prohibiting 
interracial marriages. The Supreme Court waited thirteen years after its Brown 
decision dealing with desegregation in schools before, in Loving v. Virginia, it agreed to 
consider the issue of interracial marriages. Many commentators have suggested that the 
issue of interracial marriage was far more explosive than even the maelstrom involved 
over integrated education. .. In the celebrated Loving case the Virginia trial judge in 
January, 1959 stated his legal rationale justifying the constitutionality of the 
prohibition against interracial marriages as follows: 'Almighty God created the races 
white, black, yellow, malay and red, and He placed them on separate continents. And but 
for the interference with His arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. 
The fact that He separated the races shows that He did not intend for the races to mix'" 
(41-42). 
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still to a large extent refuses to see "race" and the often violent prejudice 
which that metaphor "justifies" as an epistemological and social construction 
which has been passed down from the institution of American and Caribbean 
slavery. 
But even if the polarity of race is produced and reproduced through 
linguistic and legal interdictions, and even if spaces between are thereby made 
unsayable and invisible, these very sites of interdiction are still the weakest 
points in the logic of polarized understandings. Laws can reify the categorical 
construction of race. Categorical language creates official definitions and 
therefore ontologies of what can be conceptually seen by dominant "whites" 
and actually lived by subjugated "blacks." But the polarity of these laws and 
words suggest spaces between, which Harriet Jacobs, writing from the 
categorized position of a black fugitive slave, can suggest. As I have already 
shown, she uses one of the fundamental polarizing justifications for slavery, 
"admit[ting] the black man is inferior." But rather than stopping there, she 
asks the all-important question, "what is it that makes him so?", thus 
deconstructing the polarity to show that this cornerstone justification of 
slavery is a construction of the slave system itself. 
The example I just cited is exceptionally straightforward. That the 
slave system was brutalizing and dehumanizing was more palatable to a 
white female abolitionist audience than the aspects of Jacobs' story which deal 
with sexuality, miscegenation, and the resulting destabilization of 
black/white as reliable identity categories. In these cases she cannot simply 
make visible the spaces between and thus illuminate the blind spot, because 
the white female audience for which she writes was grounded in official 
ontologies which forbade explicit discussion of the sexual abuse resulting in 
"miscegenation" and whose polarized understanding of race produced a blind 
Schneider, 9 
spot to the conceptual instability potentially produced by that same 
miscegenation.8 Rather, Jacobs can only suggest non-polarized 
understandings inter dicta,9 or in the slippage and ambiguity between the 
words which, used categorically, function as the repolarizing interdictions she 
must combat. In other words, Jacobs must both reproduce official language 
and acceptable form, and use the ambiguity which language and form creates 
to subvert polarities and suggest spaces between. 
I use the word suggest as opposed to reveal because what cannot be 
directly expressed remains invisible insofar as it has no official ontology. The 
text does not reveal spectra of understanding because what is "seen" once one 
realizes the importance of "looking" inter dicta, is not the "content" of spaces 
between which have been made invisible by epistemological categories. 
Rather it is the existence of the blind spot, the fact of one's inability to see 
spectra, due to the polarized understandings and ontologies of American 
culture, which is suggested.10 The irony is that this is an act of looking which 
is impossible.11 How can a blind spot remain blind if one looks at it? One 
8For a discussion of "the cult of true womanhood" as it affected and was affected by 
"race," see footnote #25 
9The interesting word play of interdiction and inter dicta is used by Bhabha to a different 
end in "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," p. 30. 
10The text does not disguise its "true" meaning under a cloak of "white women's" 
language and literary form, cunningly leaving clues for the insightful reader to follow. 
Rather I think a great deal of the text's power lies not outside, but in its ability to use 
categorical language and form to suggest possible spectra between the polarized 
understandings which governed antebellum America and which have governed America in 
different ways ever since. 
11 We tend, and this tendency resonates with the constant repolarization of race in 
America, to think of the opposite of vision as "blackness" or "darkness." This is not the 
case. Blindness has nothing to do with blackness. Blackness is an extreme on a spectrum 
of color and light, a visual experience. When I was four I lost the sight in my right eye. 
For a week my brain tried to process the information sent by one seeing and one blind 
eye. But the messages my blinded eye sent were incomprehensible: "there is nothing --
not brightness or darkness -- nothing." Blindness. Our language has no way to describe 
the sensation of "seeing" nothing. For a week I refused to leave my mother's side. I 
wouldn't let her go out of the house. Luckily for both of us my brain began to refuse the 
blind eye's signals. I now only "see" with my left eye. Whatever it is my blind eye 
) 
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can only suggest it. Outline it. The possible function which the space 
between has in this text, then, is located not within it, but in the act of trying 
to look at it, trying to suggest it. 
The importance and complicated ramifications of spaces between and 
blind spots are realized spatially and physically, not just conceptually, in the 
text. For seven years Jacobs sits hidden in her grandmother's attic crawlspace. 
The attic lies between slavery and freedom in that while she hides there 
Jacobs is no longer subject to her owner, Dr. Flint. But, in that the space is so 
tiny that her limbs atrophy from disuse, she is also not free. As both a 
stepping-stone to freedom and as a prison, the attic is a physical manifestation 
of the space between the mutually exclusive conditions of slavery and 
freedom. The space is invisible not because the shape of the attic can't be seen 
from the street, but because it is so tiny that no one would ever think that a 
woman could survive there. Jacobs can see out of the attic, and from that 
position she can observe the operations of the slave community from a 
vantage point which is neither within slavery nor outside of it. 
That Jacobs' physical body inhabits a manifestation of the space 
between is not surprising. American slavery was, in its economic purposes, 
an institution of the body. The slave's body was commodified and worked, 
in the field, the house, and in the reproduction of the slave population. The 
reasons for the enslavement of black Africans by white Europeans and 
experiences has been erased from my consciousness. Sometimes I close my seeing eye 
and "look" at my blindness. But what I see is the dark inside of my seeing eye's eyelid. 
There is nothing to the right -- neither brightness nor it's visual opposite, darkness --
nothing. It is impossible for me to look at, and impossible for me to describe. The 
metaphor of the blind spot does not match perfectly the physical blindness of an eye --
the eye can be seen and cannot see, the blind spot cannot be seen, but can see. I have 
included this footnote, therefore, not to strengthen the metaphor I've chosen, but to 
attempt, and in attempting show its impossibility, to describe blindness itself. 
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Americans are complicated and not reducible to an original antagonism of 
white against black. Rather, the shift in European and African societies from 
ancient and early medieval slave systems based on criteria other than race, to 
the mass enslavement of Africans by Europeans and white Americans in the 
modern world, gave rise to the construction of a polarized understanding of 
black and white which served, and still serves, to justify the subjugation of 
those bodies designated "black" by those designated "white."12 The racialized 
"black" body13 became, thereby, the site of categorically controlling 
definitions, from the overarching definition of "slave," to stereotypes and 
constructions of racial characteristics whose implications reached, and reach, 
far beyond the body, into the minds and thought-processes of both blacks and 
whites. 
Harriet Jacobs' body was defined and therefore treated as enslaved in a 
culture where enslavement was supposedly based on mutually exclusive 
racial characteristics whose unmistakable sign was "black" skin color as 
opposed to its "opposite," "white" skin color. But Harriet Jacobs was a very 
light skinned "black" woman.14 She defines herself as a mulatto on the first 
12The history of the development of modern racism is well documented. I learned about 
it in 1989 in Stephen Volk's lecture class, "The History of The Caribbean." 
13 As opposed to the white body which often is not culturally seen and does not see itself 
as raced. Hazel Carby speaks beautifully to the need to recognize "race" as affecting 
black and white, in an explanation of Reconstructing Womanhood which was fundamental 
to my thinking about this paper: "This book works within the theoretical premises of 
societies 'structured in dominance' by class, by race, and by gender and is a materialist 
account of the cultural production of black women intellectuals within the social 
relations that inscribed them. It delineates the sexual ideologies that defined the ways in 
which white and black women 'lived' their relation to their material conditions of 
existence ... We need more feminist work that interrogates sexual ideologies for their 
racial specificity and acknowledges whiteness, not just blackness, as a racial 
categorization. Work that uses race as a central category does not necessarily need to be 
about black women" (Carby, 17-18). 
141 recently went up to an acquaintance in the Feve and asked her what was up. She said 
she had to finish reading a book in time for a class, and to my surprise she pulled out a 
much newer and less beat up'copy of the same edition of Incidents which I had in my bag. 
f . 
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page, and later in the book she's described by a "grim-looking [poor white] 
fellow" as "Dis 'ere yaller gal" (Jacobs, 65). Jacobs' skin, as a physical 
manifestation of the mutability of race, stood for herself and for generations 
of her readers "as a bodily challenge to the conventions of reading the body ... 
simultaneously insisting that the body is a sign of identity and undermining 
the assurance with which that sign can be read," as Karen Sanchez-Eppler 
puts it (Sanchez-Eppler, 41). In other words, Jacobs' body, in a slave culture 
whose logic was threatened by the discrepancy between race as a immutable 
polarity and the spectra of color perceivable on the faces and bodies of human 
beings, suggests in itself a conceptual space between. It is, at the most basic 
level, Jacobs' body which is made invisible by the blind spot. And it is that 
invisible space from which the constructedness of race might be "seen," 
which the text asks the reader to look for at every turn. But, as I will show, 
the space between racial dichotomies, which is made manifest on her body, 
cannot be suggested by that body. It is when the body is textualized by Jacobs 
herself that alternatives to "the [polarized] conventions of reading the body" 
can be suggested. 
Take, for example, the passage from Incidents which I have quoted as 
an epigraph. The passage follows a forceful indictment (and I intend all the 
resonances that word has accrued) of the hypocrisy of "Yankees" who, reviled 
by Southern planters, still "consent to do the vilest work for them, such as the 
ferocious bloodhounds and the despised negro-hunters are employed to do at 
home." Because of the Fugitive Slave Law, this condemnation has very 
broad scope: all the Northern states and their "law-abiding" citizens are 
implicated. Jacobs' outlining of the complicity of Northerners with Southern 
I said, "Wow, that's crazy -- I'm writing my thesis on that book." She said, "well then 
you can tell me. Why did they put this photograph of a white woman on the cover?" 
) 
Schneider, 13 
slavery serves to destabilize the American polarity of North and South,15 and 
to condemn Northerners as well as Southerners for the peculiar form of 
racism outlined in the dramatic statement which follows: "They seem to 
satisfy their consciences with the doctrine that God created the Africans to be 
slaves. What a libel upon the heavenly Father, who 'made of one blood all 
nations of men!'" Having established the contradiction between what 
slaveholding "Christians" understood of God's will, and what God "actually" 
intended, Jacobs follows the logic of "one blood" to the question, "And then 
who are Africans?" This could mean, if all people are of one blood, what is 
race? Does it exist? She then asks, "Who can measure the amount of Anglo-
Saxon blood coursing in the veins of American slaves?" Following right 
behind her own question 'which seems to destabilize the existence of race at 
all, Jacobs reiterates a dichotomized definition of race, creating a category of 
"Anglo-Saxon blood." But she does this only to remind the reader that that 
self-same and supposedly pure blood is "coursing," and, although she does 
not remind the reader of this, coursing as the direct result of the 
institutionalized rape of black women by white men, "in the veins of 
American slaves." Jacobs thus outlines the contradiction between the polarity 
of race as it is constructed and reinforced in America, and the spectrum of 
color as it appears on people's bodies, due partly to what is called 
miscegenation. But the truly subversive aspect of this little paragraph lies in 
the word "who."16 We have a contradictory system, Jacobs explains. The 
problem lies in the body and in the blood. Who, which body, can sort it out? 
Who is going to point out, to make visible, "the amount of Anglo-Saxon 
15This is not an unusual tactic in abolitionist literature. Frederick Douglass and 
Harriet Beecher Stowe do the same thing. 
16Thanks to Paige Sarlin for recognizing the potential of this word. 
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blood coursing in the veins of American slaves" (Jacobs, 44)? Her question is 
a rhetorical one, serving to bolster God's Word: no one can measure it, 
because it is one blood. But the question also begs for the answer, "Harriet 
Jacobs." For even in pointing out the contradiction between race as a 
constructed polarity and race as physically mutable, she has established herself 
as the revealer of racial injustice and misunderstanding. Also, and even 
more importantly, Harriet Jacobs is herself an American slave whose veins 
flow with Anglo-Saxon blood. She is, in her very own body, a measurement 
of the amount. She stands, at the most basic and bodily level, between, in the 
conceptual and ontological space made invisible by the polarized construction 
of race. 
As the sign and site of her identity, the racial invisibility of Jacobs' body 
creates a ripple effect, problematizing other dichotomized constructions and 
understandings out of which she writes. Of critical importance, because the 
text is advertised as "truth," is the polarity of truth and falsehood. Written 
for a white audience, Incidents must on the one hand present itself as "strictly 
true," in order to "arouse the women of the North to a realizing sense of the 
condition of two millions of women at the South, still in bondage" (Jacobs, 1). 
On the other hand, as Jacobs' editor, Lydia Maria Child, indicates with a subtle 
sarcasm, Jacobs' sexual experiences ''belong to a class which some call delicate 
subjects, and others indelicate." Either way, the "wrongs [are] so foul, that our 
[white women's] ears are too delicate to listen to them" (Jacobs, 4). Child 
points to the ironic polarity of "delicacy" vs. "indelicacy." The two words 
appear to be opposites, but in fact they achieve exactly the same goal. By 
claiming that sexual abuse is either too delicate or too indelicate for white 
women's ears, the need to discuss abuse is nullified. White rape of slave 




unsayable, and thereby untrue. But rape, the reality of which is told by Jacobs' 
light-skinned body, and the threat of which is used against that body, is one of 
the truths which Jacobs has to tell. Jacobs' genealogy and her sexual history, 
in other words, already place her between the constructed polarity of truth 
and falsehood, even before she begins to write what she wishes to set forth as 
truth. 
How can Jacobs write truth from a place between white antebellum 
society's construction of truth and falsehood? Hazel Carby, writing about the 
difficulty black women had in representing their sexuality in antebellum 
American, describes the problem perfectly: "narratives by black women 
embody the tension between the author's desire to privilege her experience, 
and being able to speak only within a discourse of conventionally held beliefs 
about the nature of black womanhood" (Carby, 22).17 Carby locates the 
tension between what needs to be said and what can be said. The author's 
experiences can only be expressed in the language of conventional truth. 
What occurs, therefore, is not a reverse-discourse,18 but an oscillation 
between conceptual poles, much as a sailing ship makes use of prevailing 
winds by tacking back and forth across the course it follows. I am not saying 
17See footnote #25 for Carby's outline of the way in which black and white womanhoods 
were defined over against one another, with black womanhood negatively defined at every 
turn. 
18Judith Butler outlines the difference between reverse-discourse and invisibility quite 
nicely: "Here it becomes important to recognize that oppression works not merely 
through acts of overt prohibition, but covertly, through the constitution of viable 
subjects and through the corollary constitution of a domain of unviable (un)subjects --
abjects, we might call them -- who are neither named nor prohibited within the 
economy of the law ... To be prohibited explicitly is to occupy a discursive site from 
which something like reverse-discourse can be articulated; to be implicitly proscribed 
is not even to qualify as an act of prohibition (Butler, 20). The 
invisibility/inarticulation of the mulatta in ante-bellum literature and culture is 
complicated in different ways than the invisibilitylinarticulation of the lesbian in 
contemporary America, but I find this discussion nevertheless helpful in understanding 
the invisibility and silence of spaces between. 
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that Harriet Jacobs consciously delineated a space between in this manner. I 
am saying that the ambiguities which many readers, of whom I will examine 
three representative ones, have pointed out in the text serve to encompass 
spaces between the controlling and defining polarities of race and truth. 
This constant slippage and ambiguity raise questions of authority.19 
From its writing to its present-day reception, readings of Incidents have been 
obsessed with its authority, from the question of "is this story true," to "who 
actually wrote it," to "to whom does the text speak" to "who owns it." The 
persistence of this concern serves to point up the existence and continued 
effect of the text's ability to slip out from under authoritarian categories. I 
will examine three readings of the text, chosen for their historical and 
representative positions as well as for their dramatic effect: an 1861 review, 
John Blassingame's 1972 dismissal of the text as "fiction," and Joanne M. 
Braxton's 1986 response, after the "authenticity" of Incidents was re-
established. If the subversive potential of the text lies in spaces between 
which caml0t be seen or articulated, how can and should authority, in all its 
19 Authority is an extremely complicated word, and I mean to use it as such. Gilbert and 
Gubar quote Edward Said's discussion of the word in The Madwoman in The Attic: 
"Authority suggests to me a constellation of linked meanings ... .'a power to enforce 
obedience,' or 'a derived or delegated power,' or 'a power to inspire belief,' or 'a person 
whose opinion is accepted' .... a person who originates or gives existence to something, a 
begetter, beginner, father, or ancestor, a person also who sets forth written statements . 
. . . an increaser and thus a fo·under. Auctoritas is production, invention, cause, in 
addition to meaning a right of posseSSion. Finally, it means continuance, or a causing to 
continue. Taken together these meanings are all grounded in the following notions: (1) 
that of the power of an individual to initiate, institute, establish -- in short, to begin; 
(2) that this power and its product are an increase over what had been there previously; 
(3) that the individual wielding this power controls its issue and what is derived 
therefrom; (4) that authority maintains the continuity of its course" (Gilbert and 
Gubar, 4). Gilbert and Gubar discuss very helpfully how these definitions do not work 
for and in fact work against [white] women authors. If we recognize that the four 
concepts Said identifies are grounded are precisely those notions, or rights, which are 
legally denied the slave, in particular the slave mother whose children [and perhaps by 
extension, whose "narratives"] are not hers to "author," then the word potentially has 
different and very specifically harmful dysfunctions in the Afro-American woman 
author's experience, especially the woman slave narrator. 
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meanings, be granted and/or claimed by the text? The construction of race 
has the authority of an interdiction: one is either black or white. Equally, our 
understanding of veracity has the authority of an interdiction: something is 
either true or it is false. But if a text functions between polarities, if it 
resonates "inter dicta," or between the lines, what happens to race? To 
veracity? To authority?20 Readers have, at different times, offered different 
and often contradictory answers to these questions . 
.. .. .. 
Harriet Jacobs' body functions at a base level to suggest the space 
between. In its appearance, her body denies the "logic" of the polarization of 
race. Harriet Jacobs' darker-than-"white" skin, or more appropriately, her 
Mrican ancestry, designates her a slave. Her lighter-than-"black" skin, which 
reveals her .~uropean ancestry, serves as living proof of the existence of 
miscegenation and therefore of the possibility of the passage across 
generations between supposedly "opposite" races. Because she was a woman, 
Jacobs' body had the very specific function within the slave economy of 
producing more slaves. Thus, both as the site of past miscegenations, and as 
the potential producer of more in-between bodies, Jacobs' female, light-
skinned body can be seen to function as a fundamental threat to the 
20Homi Bhabha has very strongly influenced me in my thinking about the importance of 
authority in a text like this. He writes: "The visibility of mimicry is always produced 
at the site of interdiction. It is a form of colonial discourse at the crossroads of what is 
known and permissible and that which though known must be kept concealed; a discourse 
uttered between the lines and as such both against the rules and within them. The 
question of representation of difference is therefore always also a problem of authority" 
(Bhabha, 126). 
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dichotomized construction of race on which the justifications for slavery 
were built. 
There is, however, a discrepancy between the body's experience as 
enslaved, and the constructedness of race which that body's light skin helps to 
reveal. The spectrum which Jacobs' body advertised, while it may have 
affected the way in she was treated, possibly making her more of a sexual 
commodity in the eyes of her white master, did not affect the fact that she 
lived as a slave and her body was used as such. 
Jacobs recognizes the ironies of the discrepancy between the spectrum 
of color as it appears before the eyes and the polarity of race as it was enforced 
in antebellum America. Describing her Uncle Benjamin's escape, she writes, 
"For once his white face did him a kindly service. They had no suspicion that 
it belonged to a slave; otherwise the law would have been followed out to the 
letter, and the thing rendered back to slavery" (24). She describes her uncle's 
"passing" as a bitter joke on whites who believe that they can read race but 
instead are "s~aves" to the polarized understanding of race. Also in reference 
to her uncle she makes a veiled commentary on her own position as a light-
skinned slave woman. Describing Benjamin after his months in jail, she 
writes, "Long confinement had made his face too pare; his form too thin." 
But a slave-trader, seeing Benjamin in that state, "said he would give any 
price if the handsome lad was a girl. We thanked God that he was not" (23). 
Jacobs does not, in discussing the sexual desire of either her master, Dr. Flint, 
or her white lover, Mr. Sands, make reference to her s~ color, but the anger 
she feels is quite clear in this reference to her uncle, in which his paleness is 
made unnatural by confinement, and then sexualized in that heightened state 
by the slaveholder's gender-bending gaze. "We thanked God he was not [a 
girl]," because while whiteness, according to the polarized construction of 
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race, is a sign of freedom, and for women bearing that sign, of purity and true 
womanhood, one of the many fallacies in the construction of race is that the 
"whiter" the "black" woman the more sexually desirable and therefore 
valuable she is to white men.21 The body of Harriet Jacobs, therefore, is a 
very complicated "thing." It defines her as a slave, is commodified by 
slavery, and, in its light skin, both delineates a space between black and white 
which undermines that construction and serves, sexually, to commodify her 
still further. 
In her lived experience, then, Jacobs' light-skinned body does nothing 
to assuage her situation as a slave.22 But there is a radical difference between 
Jacobs' lived experience as a slave defining, defined by and occupying her 
body, and her very carefully constructed text designed for a white audience 
which, albeit abolitionist, was as saturated with the polarized construction of 
race as those who lived south of the Mason-Dixon line. Writing about 
conventions of reading in antebellum America, Karen Sanchez-Eppler 
describes how ·~'the bodies of women and slaves were read against them ... for 
21 James Norcom, the real name of Dr. Flint, ran an advertisement in the American 
Beacon of July 4, 1835, for the capture of Harriet Jacobs. He described her thus: "She 
is a light mulatto, 21 years of age, about 5 feet 4 inches high, of a thick and corpulent 
habit, having on her head a thick covering of black hair that curls naturally, but which 
can be easily combed straight" (Incidents, 215). A description of Jacobs' body is of 
utmost importance to a potential slave-catcher. Jacobs' body is of utmost importance to 
Norcom who, according to Jacobs, desires her both as property and sexually. Ironically, 
contained within his description of that body is the acknowledgement of its racial 
ambiguity. That ambiguity, however, is a blind-spot, looked at but not seen. On a 
personal and entirely subjective note, this description made my skin crawl, because, 
having read Jacobs, I could smell in Norcom's description of the body he considered his, 
and in his assertion that "this girl absconded from the plantation of my son without any 
known cause of provocation," the utter complacency and assurance of someone who 
thinks, knows he's right. Someone for whom rape and torture are as common and 
unremarkable as a plate of eggs. 
22"Passing," in fact, is an answer to the problem of race relations which she finds at 
best grimly amusing, as with her uncle's experience, at worst, despicable: "I knew this 
colored man had spent many nights hunting for me. Every body knew he had the blood of 
a slave father in his veins; but for the sake of passing himself off for white, he was 
ready to kiss the slaveholder's feet. How I despised him" '{119)1 
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both the human body was seen to function as the foundation not only of a 
general subjection but also of a specific exclusion from political discourse" 
(30). But when Jacobs moves from a situation in which her body represents 
her to one in which she is representing her own body in writing, she is able to 
engage in a "political discourse." Sanchez-Eppler explains how "For women 
and slaves the ability to speak was predicated upon the reinterpretation of 
their flesh ... Transformed from a silent site of oppression into a symbol of 
that oppression, the body becomes within both feminist and abolitionist 
discourses a means of gaining rhetorical force" (30). The difference thus lies 
in how Jacobs' body is misused as a living, breathing organism, and the 
rhetorical potential which that body's representation has, through Jacobs' 
own inscription of its experiences into text. The hypocrisy of the slave 
system may have been manifest on her body, but her body still lived as a slave 
to that hypocrisy. It is in -her text, where she represents bodies using the very 
words which name bodies, that she is able to suggest the space between. 
How does she do this? Of utmost importance is the fact that she cannot 
use words at their face value, for it is her own "face's value" which words 
define. When she begins to represent her face and body in text, she can 
accentuate the gaps occasioned by the slippages arid the ambiguities of the play 
of words to suggest spaces between institutionalized polarities of thought and 
understanding. For example, after describing the brutal wave of white 
terrorism which followed Nat Turner's 1831 rebellion, Jacobs writes that "No 
two people that had the slightest tinge of color in their faces dared to be seen 
walking together" ijacobs,64). This sentence is divided between the sarcastic 
tone in which Jacobs writes "the slightest tinge of color" and the ominous 
warning that such people "dared [not] be seen walking together." She thus 
points out 1:>oth the mutability of race, and the bloody way in which "the 
\ 
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slightest tinge of color" was forced to the persecuted "bfack" side of the racial 
polarity. The irony is that "the slightest tinge of color/' a phrase which she so 
beautifully uses in the text to invoke the spectrum which unites and 
therefore conceptually negates the polarity of race, could not, as an actual 
physical manifestation outside the text, invoke that spectrum, and in fact 
invoked racist violence. The polarized construction of race is lived by the 
bodies of all slaves, regardless of their color,23 but textuality allows Jacobs to 
reconstruct bodies for her readership, and in doing so, to show how race is 
constructed and reified by the slave system. 
231n her chapter "Fear of Insurrection" Jacobs explores the ironies of the construction 
of race by flipping the characteristics which "black" and "white" are expected to signify 
through a description of the expectations which poor whites had of blacks. In her 
description of poor whites Jacobs demonstrates that the low levels of intelligence and 
social grace assumed to accrue to "black" skin are not reflections of "race" at all, but of 
class. The chapter is an account of the wave of white terrorism which followed Nat 
Turner's rebellion in 1831. "Low [poor] whites" (Jacobs, 63) are described as looting 
and terrorizing the slave and free black population. When the poor whites are actually 
in Jacobs' grandmother's house and going through her possessions, they come across 
bedding and table cloths. "Where'd the damned niggers git all dis sheet an' table clarf? 
.. White folks oughter have 'em all" (Jacobs, 65). This passage is striking because by 
using dialect to make the poor whites appear far less cultured than her slave family, 
Jacobs disrupts convention; the whites, rather than the blacks, are represented as 
linguistically ignorant, an important strategy if the power of language as interdiction is 
remembered. The passage is also important because the speakers' surprise reveals the 
distance between tne expectations of what ~black" and "wh.te" mean in terms of material 
comfort, and the possible realities. The speaker makes two distinctions in his speech, 
between "niggers" and "white folks," and between people with sheets and people without. 
In his mind, these two polarities ought to have a logical relationship to one another. But, 
as Jacobs suggests, the two poles are only related in so far as that relationship is 
brutally enforced. This distinction is also made early in this chapter in one of Jacobs' 
most incisive and straight-forward condemnations of the slave system. She writes of the 
"low whites" brutality: "They exulted in such a chance to exercise a little brief 
authority, and show their subserviency to the slaveholders; not reflecting that the 
power which trampled on the colored people also kept themselves in poverty, ignorance, 
and moral degradation" (Jacobs, 64). Jacobs could easily have garnered "sympathy" for 
her cause had she portrayed the brutality of the poor whites as purely a function of their 
race. But by naming the common denominator of oppreSSion as "power" rather than 
"race," Jacobs subtilely deconstructs race itself, suggesting instead that poor whites and 
enslaved blacks have a common enemy in the planter class . . 
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The textualization of the body is also important due to antebellum 
implications of the act of writing. As Henry Louis Gates, Jr. discusses in his 
introduction to "Race," Writing, and Difference, the ability to write was seen 
by white Europeans and Americans as synonymous wi,th the ability to reason. 
Mricans were considered inferior because, according to white writers, "they 
had developed no systems of writing and had not mastered the art of writing 
in European languages" (Gates, 11). This philosophical belief was, of course, 
bolstered not by a "natural" scale of intelligence based on "race," but by the 
laws of slave holding nations, which made illegal slave literacy. Thus the use 
of the written word, and therefore the representation of slaves and free blacks 
through the written word, became the legally enforced exclusive terrain of 
white writers. But, as Gates points out, "Black people responded to these 
profoundly serious allegations about their 'nature' as directly as they could: 
they wrote books, poetry, autobiographical narratives" (Gates, 11). But, as 
antebellum black writers addressing white audiences found, using the 
language and forms which many white writers used to represent and define 
blacks negatively was extremely restricting. Much subversive content was 
forced inter dicta, or between words, between lines, between rules. To look 
one last time at her description of her uncle, Jacobs clearly understands the 
potentially negative power of language. "The letter of the law," in naming a 
"black" man a "thing," serves to constantly reify th~ polarized construction of 
race. But if words and names are thus interdicted aga~st the body, Jacobs uses 
that same language in a way that she cannot use her body: "For once his 
white face did him a kindly service." The bitter phrase "for once" implies 
that a "white face," while supposedly situating one on the "free" side of the 
polarity, is in fact a sign which doesn't help the slave, whose slave status is 
based metaphorically on skin color but legally on '''the condition of the 
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mother." The next phrase, "They had no suspicion that it [his face] belonged 
to a slave," condemns the understanding of race which sees "white" as free 
and "black" as enslaved, and which upholds a contradictory system whereby 
Benjamin's white face is named "black" and therefore slave. The status of 
slave in these two sentences is revealed to have no founding in a biological 
racial duality. Rather, the interdictions of law and the legalized categorical 
language of "race" construct the slave system: "Otherwise, the law would 
have been carried out to the letter, and the thing rendered back to slavery." 
Thus Jacobs leads us from Benjamin's "white face" which, according to the 
skewed logic of the polarized construction of race, should make him a free 
man, to the legality of slavery which sees the children of slave mothers as 
things, regardless of color. Law and the power of categorical language become 
the target of Jacobs' deco~tructive capacities. AI' she indicates using the 
common phrase, "the letter of the law," law is composed of words, and words 
are composed of letters. The law, its constructedness revealed, is as perverse 
as the polarized understanding of race which naturalizes law. One could say 
that Harriet Jacobs carries the law out to the letter in that she tears its 
language, its letters, apart to reveal the tragically absurd power of categories 
which allow a human being to be defined as a thing.24 Thus, by using the 
language which, as Gates has shown, often negatively defined her body, Jacobs 
can suggest the constructedness and the logic of the legally and linguistically 
interdicted system which enslaves her body. 
These sentence to sentence suggestions of spaces between extend to 
'., 
Jacobs' use of genre and the conventions of sentimentality, and the way in 
24The title of her chapter on her uncle, "The Slave Who Dared to Feel Like a Man," uses 
the constructed polarity of the words "slave" and "man," one of the fundamental 
justifications for slavery being that black men are not, in fact, men but a lower form of 
life, to suggest by simply showcasing the polarity, the space between those poles. 
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which she positions herself as author. As a text ~ttempting to communicate 
the horror of the, American slave system to a white female audience deeply 
initiated into the cult of true womanhood, Incidents must negotiate tricky 
territory regarding issues of sex and race relations.25 The first sentence of 
Jacobs' preface says a great deal about how her body as reconstructed in the 
text and her role as the author of that text, functioned as intermediaries 
between the poles of black and white as they were understood in antebellum 
America. "Reader, be assured this narrative is no fiction" (Jacobs, 1). This 
famous sentence contains within it the complex and often contradictory 
system of constructed identities and assumptions which Jacobs, as a "black" 
female fugitive slave writing for a "white" female abolitionist audience, had 
to negotiate. 
25Hazel Carby provides a stunning analyses of the cult of true womanhood and the effect 
it had on white i;lnd black understanding of black female sexuality: "The dominating 
ideology to define the boundaries of acceptable female behavior from the 1820s until the 
Civil War was the 'cult of true womanhood.' Barbara Welter, a feminist historian, has 
characterized its basic tenets: 'the attributes of True Womanhood, by which a woman 
judged herself and was judged by her husband, her neighbors and society, could be 
divided into four cardinal virtues -- piety, purity, submissiveness and domesticity .... 
With them she was promised happiness and power.' ... The parameters of the ideological 
discourse of true womanhood were bound by a shared social understanding that external 
physical appearance reflected internal qualities of character and therefore provided an 
easily discernible indicator of the function of a female of lhe human species. . .. While 
fragility was valorized as the ideal sate of woman, heavy labor required other physical 
attributes. Strength and ability to bear fatigue, argued to be so distasteful a presence in 
a white woman, were positive features to be emphasized in the promotion and selling of a 
black female field hand a slave auction. " .To:qualify as a "true woman." the possession 
of virtue was an imperative. . .. Overt sexuality, on the other hand, emerged in the 
images of the bthck woman, where 'charm' revealed its relation to the dark forces of evil 
and magic. . .. Thus, the white slave master was not regarded as being responsible for 
his actions toward his black female slaves. On the contrary, it was the female slave who 
was held responsible for being a potential, and direct, t~reat tho the conjugal sanctity of 
the white mistress. . .. Any historical investigation of the ideological boundaries of the 
cult of true womanhood is a sterile field without a recognition of the dialectical 
relationship with the alternative sexual code associated wit~ the black woman. Existing 
outside the definition of true womanhood, black female sexuality was nevertheless used 
to define what those boundaries were. The contradictions at a material and ideological 
level can clearly be seen in the dichotomy between repressed and overt representations 
of sexuality" (Carby, 23-30). 
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That Jacobs chooses to call her book a "narrative" is significant, since 
Incidents is not a slave "narrative" in the traditional sense. The most famous 
and influential narratives were written by fugitive slaves themselves, but the 
majority of slave narratives and interviews with fugitive slaves were 
"narrated" to a white abolitionist scribe, who functioned as a mediating and 
authenticating buffer between the story of the slave and the white audience 
which was to hear it.26 Jean Fagan Yellin, in her analysis of anti-slavery 
emblems, Women and Sisters, explicates the function of this mediating and 
authenticating presence. A popular anti-slavery emblem was that of the slave 
woman bound in chains, kneeling before the white female figure of Liberty or 
Justice. "With the inclusion of an empowered white chain-breaking liberator, 
the enchained black supplicants are seen as powerless. The appearance of the 
chain-breaker between shive and slaveholder makes it unnecessary for the 
slaves to rise and break their own chains." In other words, the presence of the 
"liberator" takes away any agency the slave may have, thereby making the 
slave safe to both abolitionist and slaveholding whites. The white liberator 
functions as a benevolent and helpful presence to the kneeling black woman, 
whose potential power her benevolence negates. Her benevolence promises a 
26Narratives written by fugitive slaves have survived the abolitionist era as literature 
interesting for other reasons. As literature directed to a white abolitionist audience, 
however, the slave narrative written by the fugitive him or herself was one of many 
forms, now almost completely obscure, most of which were written by white writers for 
white readers. From articles in The National Antislavery Standard, to short stories 
published in annual women's publication, The Liberty Bell, the vast majority, or the 
pulp, if you will, of abolitionist literature, was written by whites for whites. Although 
self-written narratives such as Jacobs' and Douglass' attracted ~nd continue to attract 
far more attention than the proliferation of white abolitiqnist propaganda, the white 
audience which originally received Jacobs' text was indoctrinated by that white 
abolitionist propaganda. For more information on the way this white on white literature 
represented and used the "subject" of the black slave, see Sanchez-Eppler, Yellin, and 
Grimm. 
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smooth transition from slavery to "freedom," as long as freedom does not 
mean "equality," but continues black dependance on white benevolence. 
In 1837 the First Anti-Slavery Convention of American Women gave a 
formal endorsement to the use of such emblems, hoping "that the speechless 
agony of the fettered slave may unceasingly appeal to the heart of the patriot, 
the philanthropist and the christian [sic]" (Yellin,5). Yellin wonders, "did the 
freeborn white abolitionist feminists see their task as speaking for the 
'voiceless'slave? Did they see it as enabling the slave to sound her own 
voice on the platform and in print?" (Yellin, 25) One answer lies in the fact 
that a figure similar to white-skinned Justice, a benevolent white abolitionist 
scribe, was necessary to mediate not between the slave narrator and the slave-
holding South, but between the narrator and her "sympathetic" audience of 
northern white women. The "speechless agony," in other words, was not 
speechless -- fugitive slaves were ready and willing to tell their stories. But 
these stories as they were presented in the genre of the slave narrative were 
highly edited And molded for white consumption. 
Although the white abolitionist Lydia Maria Child had a hand in 
editing Incidents, and although it is framed by Child's "authenticating" 
preface and (surprisingly, because he was black) Geo~ge W. Lowther's 
postscript, Harriet Jacobs' Incidents in the Life of A Slave Girl is, as the title 
emphatically declares, Written By Herself. Who then, is the "narrative" 
narrated to? Who is the intermediary, the authenticator? Who makes this 
story safe? The answer is simple, and of utmost importance: the narrative, 
which begins "reader," is narrated directly to that reader. The interlocutor27 
27The American Heritage Dictionary offers as a secondary meaning of "interlocutor" this 
highly fascinating definition: "The performer in a minstrel show who is placed midway 
between the end men and engages in banter with them." This resonates with this thesis 
because of between of the interlocutor's position between two constructed racial 
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becomes both Jacobs herself, in so far as she directly relates the story via the 
text, and the white reader, in so far as she reads that text. The responsibility 
for making the text palatable, and for drawing attention to blind spots, is 
placed directly on Jacobs and her readership. 
With Jacobs as her own mediator, the issue of veracity becomes 
extremely important. Just as slaves' testimony had no authority in a court of 
law,28 so Jacobs' testimony as a fugitive slave amounts to that of a non-
authority. As those of a black woman, Jacobs' experiences can, according to 
prevailing conventions, only be authenticated for white readers by the "good 
word" of a white friend, yet that word is present only in a short preface to a 
volume "written by herself." In her first sentence, therefore, Jacobs reflects 
the bind she is in. "Reader, be assured this narrative [which, in the sense that 
it is not narrated to a white mediator, is no narrative] is no fiction." Her story 
cannot be authenticated without the white intermediary voice, but it will not 
be her story if it is authenticated by that voice. The mediating presence of a 
white "liberator" creates a "speechless agony" in the black slave's ability to 
communicate her experience, not because she is naturally unable to express 
herself, but because the benevolence of the liberating figure creates in the 
liberator's mind a definition of the slave as silent sufferer. Since black 
women were denied the right to speak at all in prQper discourse, "narratives 
identities will be central to this paper. The very phenomenon of minstrel shows, 
theatrical presentations in which white men wore black-face and acted out their 
constructions of black-identity, is an extremely interesting in relation to this thesis. 
The politics of white actors donning black face in order to both denigrate (another 
fascinating and disturbingly germane etymology: from the Latin denigrare, or, to 
blacken) and appropriate "black" identity is very interesting, as is the fact that as the 
form developed, black actors who wished to perform for a white audience found it 
necessary to wear black-face as well -- in other words, black actors had to don a 
stereotyped/constructed black identity, and it was only from behind that "mask that 
grins and lies" that they could criticize the construction itself. ******SOURCE 
28See Higgenbotham, p. 124 
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by [them] embody the tension between the author's desire to privilege her 
experience and her ability to speak only within a discourse of conventionally 
held beliefs about the nature of black womanhood" (Carby, 22). It is this 
tension, operative throughout Incidents, which has troubled so many readers. 
Not looking between the poles of truth/falsehood, readers such as John 
Blassingame have felt that if Jacobs is restricted in how she tells her story by 
the form in which she must tell it, if, in other words she cannot "tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," then her story must be 
false. Readers such as Alice A. Deck, believing Jacobs' narrative to be 
"authentic", nevertheless feel that the authenticity of Jacobs' black female 
slave experience lies somewhere beneath the falsifying trappings of the 
story.29 I would suggest that a more fruitful question than "is this story true, 
" or "how is Jacobs oppressed by the genres she of necessity employs," is "how 
is Jacobs using the forms she has available?" 
Having tackled and claimed "narrative" for herself, Jacobs continues in 
her first sentence to tackle and undermine the conventions of sentimentality 
even as she adopts the sentimental form. While it functions as a claim to 
veracity, it is extremely important that Jacobs chose to specifically term her 
narrative "no fiction." Fiction, as it was employed by white abolitionists, was 
a form which Jacobs needed, as a black woman writing about her sexual 
experience, to distance herself from. In the novels and stories written by 
white female abolitionists for a white female abolitionist audience,30 slave 
bodies and experiences were written and read in such a way as to silence and 
291 will not be using Deck's article when analyzing the book's reception, but I found it 
exemplary of a certain kind of reading. See Alice A. Deck, "Whose Book is This?: 
Authorial Versus (sic) Editorial Control of Harriet Jacobs' Incidents in the Life of a 
Slave Girl: Written By Herself." 
30For examples of and critical work on these novels and stories, see Karen Sanchez-
Eppler's "Bodily Bonds: The Intersecting Rhetorics of Feminism and Abolition." 
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appropriate those bodies and experiences for white consumption. Rather 
than textualizing the light-skinned "black" body in order to destabilize the 
polarization of race, these antebellum writers used the "mulatta" to buttress 
that polarization. 
According to the conventions of sentimentality, "the self is externally 
displayed and the body provides a reliable sign of who one is" (Sanchez-
Eppler,36). White abolitionist sentimental writers were therefore confronted 
with the problem of how, when white is good and black is bad, when white is 
beautiful and black is ugly, to "depict a black body that can be instantly 
recognized ... as a hero or a heroine" (Sanchez-Eppler, 37). Many solved this 
problem by writing tales of the tragic mulatta, a "black" woman with very 
light skin. At first glance this move may appear a questioning of the 
polarized construction of race through acknowledgement of the mutability of 
race. In fact, the white abolitionists' fictional mulatta preserved racial 
boundaries. She was a heroine who, because of her "whiteness," could be 
sympathized with but who also, because of her "blackness," could and must 
fall sexually. Sanchez-Eppler suggests that this pattern "demonstrates the 
usefulness of the slave woman for the white woman's sexuality, and 
particularly the usefulness of the mulatta, who in being part white and part 
black. .. simultaneously embodies self and other" (42). The white reader 
could vicariously experience sexuality through reading the body of the 
fictional mulatta under the guise of antislavery "sentiment." The fictional 
mulatta, in her story of virtue soiled, embodied what for a true (white) 
woman was unacknowledgeable: the space between virtue and sexual 
depravity, which involves desire and the reality of sexual abuse. 
But because the "white" body of the fictional mulatta is really "black," 
the white reader need never allow the titillating glimpse of that space 
) 
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between to impinge upon her true womanhood. The white reader can 
sympathetically follow the fictional mulatta into the forbidden realm of 
sexual desire and sexual abuse, but, at the point at which the fictional mulatta 
inevitably "falls," the white reader can re-polarize her understanding of race -
- color the mulatta "black" and herself "white" -- and maintain her adherence 
to true womanhood. The figure of the fictional mulatta, therefore, while her 
situation between the races is acknowledged and used in abolitionist fiction, is 
not an indicator of a space between the poles of black and white. As Sanchez-
Eppler points out, the body of the fictional mulatta "embodies self and 
other," or, in other words, maintains the dichotomy of race rather than 
unsettling it. The body is self in so far as it is "white" and strives toward 
virtue, other in so far as it is "black" and must therefore fall. 
Once fallen, the tragic mulatta must, of course, die. The well-rehearsed 
misogyny inherent in the ever-repeated death of fallen (white) women is 
quite evident here. But Sanchez-Eppler sees another, equally disturbing trend 
in the fact that "the freedom offered by antislavery fiction regularly depends 
upon killing off black bodies, defining death as a glorious emancipation from 
plantation slavery" (51). The obliteration of darkness from the bodies of black 
heroines in order to make white readers sympathetic while still maintaining 
"blackness" in order to keep that sympathy at a safe distance, and the 
achievement of freedom through death, which, while envisioning freedom 
for slaves, also envisions the destruction of black bodies, make sentimental 
abolitionist fiction a dangerous genre for Harriet Jacobs to adopt. 
Jacobs addresses and rejects the vision of freedom which calls for the 
death of the black body. Although she couches her rejection by professing 
love for Miss Fanny, the old white woman who wishes a sentimental death 
on her, Jacobs clearly takes her to task for her condescending and morbid wish 
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"that I and all my grandmother's family were at rest in our graves, for not 
tmtil then should she feel any peace about us" (Jacobs, 89). Jacobs acerbically 
comments that "The good old soul did not dream that I was planning to 
bestow peace upon her, with regard to myself and my children; not by death, 
but by securing our freedom" (Jacobs, 89). Since Miss Fanny pointedly does 
not desire Jacobs' freedom, one suspects that not only would she rather see 
Jacobs dead than tormented by Dr. Flint, she would also rather see her dead 
than free. This hint, along with Jacobs' sarcastic reference to how she intends 
to "bestow peace upon her," acknowledges and dismisses as offensive the 
perversely romantic and violent notion of emancipation through death. 
By claiming that her "narrative is no fiction," Jacobs suggests in her 
very first sentence that her text should not be seen in the light of abolitionist 
fiction. This mulatta character will not fulfill the sexualized self/other 
polarity for white women's vicarious enjoyment. Nor will she take part in 
the killing of black bodies, her own or anyone else's. To this end, Jacobs uses 
the convention of sentimentality just as she uses words and sentences. Even 
as she adopts the genre of the sentimental novel, she refuses to use and in fact 
works to destroy the conventions of sentimentality and the destructive 
representations of black bodies which the figure of the fictional mulatta and 
the death of the black body in abolitionist fiction mandate. Those sites of 
sentimental interdiction become and are maintained in Jacobs' text as sites of 
inter diction, where Jacobs, through suggesting its constructedness, refuses to 
capitulate to the polarized tmderstanding of race~ 
The power of Incidents' spaces between lies not in any utopian 
realization of or even in a desire for the realization of a non-polarized 
understanding of race. Rather, its power lies in its constant potential to 
suggest blind spots in the readers' racial understandings, spots which, because 
\ 
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they are unrecognized, serve to naturalize and buttress racist ideologies. This 
unwavering suggestive power is carried out to and reinforced by the end of 
the narrative.31 Incidents, in my reading, ends both powerfully, and, in its 
vision of "freedom" and American race relations, without placation or 
resolution. 
In the second-to-last paragraph, Jacobs writes two "logical" last 
sentences to her narrative. "Reader," she writes, mirroring her first sentence, 
"my story ends with freedom; not in the usual way, with marriage. I and my 
children are now free!" Q"acobs, 201). This, like the opening sentence, is a 
complicated refusal of both the slave narrative form, and the conventions of 
sentimentality. Seen as a slave narrative, the story does end in the usual way. 
The arrival at the North, often presented as synonymous with freedom, is the 
goal and end of many slave narratives. By claiming that freedom is an 
unusual ending for her story, and that the usual ending would be marriage, 
Jacobs aligns herself more strongly with the sentimental tradition, a move 
which may be intended to strengthen a sense of similarity between herself 
and her white readership. But she only alludes to Incidents' sentimental 
leanings in order to refute them; the story does not end in marriage, and, as 
the sentence is constructed, marriage is made distinctly separate from 
freedom. The text thus slides out from under both the slave narrative genre 
and the conventions of sentimentality. The reader, used to mediated 
endings, is left as her own interlocutor, with Jacobs' "freedom" unmediated 
31 Nellie McKay, in her 1987 article, "Reflections on Black Women Writers: Revising 
the Literary Canon," claims that at the close of Incidents, Jacobs "tell us of her success 
in finding employment after her escape, and of the happy union she had with her children 
in the North" (McKay, 253). This simplification of the text down to its "happy ending" 
plot elements is, I think, a prime example of a reader not "looking" inter dicta. Thus the 
ending can be, and it has been, read as placidly and benignly "happy." 
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by convention. To this extent, Jacobs frees herself from categorical 
conventions as well as from slavery. 
But Incidents does not end on this note~ If Jacobs refuses to cushion 
"freedom" in well-recited literary tradition, she also doesn't allow "freedom" 
to cushion the end of her story. "Freedom" is a metaphor, like "race." Like 
"race," however, it is a metaphor which, because of legal and linguistic 
interdictions, has great effects on lived experience. Jacobs continues, "We are 
as free from the power of slaveholders as are the white people of the north; 
and though that, according to my ideas, is not saying a great deal, it is a vast 
improvement in my condition" Qacobs, 201). "Freedom" is contextualized to 
mean "freedom from the _power of slaveholders." While it is an enormous 
and wonderful achievement, her "freedom" means only that Jacobs is no 
longer legally owned by Dr. Flint. Jacobs does not extend "freedom" any 
further than that specific legal interdiction which she has overcome. 
Early in the text, Jacobs defines white women's freedom by their ability 
to take care of their children without interference. At the end Jacobs points 
out that this sort of freedom is exactly what she has not achieved: "The 
dream of my life is not yet realized. I do not sit with my children in a home 
of my own. I still long for a hearthstone of my own, however humble. I wish 
it for my children's sake far more than for my own" Qacobs, 201). On page 
sixteen, Jacobs specifically draws attention to the difference between free 
mothers and slave mothe~s. Addressing "you happy free women" directly, 
Jacobs writes, "Children bring their little offerings, and raise their rosy lips for 
a caress. They are your own, and no hand but that of death can take them 
from you" Qacobs, 16). On the day before the New Year's auction, however, 
the slave mother "sits on her cold cabin floor, watching the children who 
may all be tom from her the next morning; and often does she wish that she 
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and they might die before the day dawns. She may be an ignorant creature, 
degraded by the system that has brutalized her from childhood; but she has a 
mother's instincts, and is capable of feeling a mother's agonies" (Jacobs, 16). 
This absolute distinction between slave women's and free white women's 
experience haunts even the end of her story. The "brutalizing system" which 
creates the dichotomy between white and slave motherhood is not directly 
recalled at the book's close, but it is suggested by the continued textual 
insistence on the complicity of the North with Southern slavery, coupled 
with Jacobs' refusal to equate the North with an ideal of "freedom." 
The second to last paragraph ends when, as feminist critic Nellie 
McKay interprets it, Jacobs "tell[s] us of her success in finding employment 
after her escape" (McKay, 253). I think the end of this paragraph in fact creates 
a suggestive inconsistency in her representation of "freedom." Mter her 
indictment of Northern "freedom" Jacobs writes: "But God so orders 
circumstances as to keep me with my friend [and employer], Mrs. Bruce. 
Love, duty, gratitude, also bind me to her side. It is a privilege to serve her 
who pities my oppressed people, and who has bestowed the inestimable boon 
of freedom on me and my children" (Jacobs, 201). Mrs. Bruce "bestowed" 
freedom on Jacobs by buying her from Dr. Flint's inheritors. When Mrs. 
Bruce tells Jacobs of her intention to buy her, Jacobs says that "The more my 
mind had become enlightened the more difficult it was for me to consider 
myself an article of property. . .. I wrote to Mrs. Bruce, thanking her, but 
saying that being sold from one owner to another seemed too much like 
slavery; that such a great obligation could not be easily cancelled; and that I 
preferred to go to my brother in California" (Jacobs, 199). Jacobs clearly states 
that her personal integritY and her own understanding of what freedom 
means will not bear the sale of her body, and she specifically asks that the end, 
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her "freedom," not be made to justify the means by which it is achieved. 
However, "By the next mail I received this brief letter from Mrs. Bruce: 'I am 
rejoiced to tell you that the money for your freedom has been paid to Mr. 
Dodge Uacobs' new owner]. Come home to-morrow. I long to see you and 
my sweet babe" (Jacobs, 199-200). The devastating irony that Jacobs' 
"freedom" was procured for her against her will through the sale of her own 
body is made very clear in her telling of the story. I also do not think it is an 
accident that she quotes Mrs. Bruce's exact words: "The money for your 
freedom has been paid .... Come ho~e to-morrow." This "freedom" has 
strings attached, strings which allow Mrs. Bruce to authoritatively say "come 
home [back to work] to-morrow," even when Jacobs has stated her intention 
to make her home with her brother in California. Just as Jacobs feared, "such 
a great obligation Uacobs' responsibility to Child for her purchase] could not be 
easily cancelled" (Jacobs, 199). This means by which Jacobs' freedom was 
obtained, and her vehement reaction to it,32 seem incongruous with her 
humble expressions of gratitude a few paragraphs later.33 Having made it 
32Jacobs' reaction to Mrs. Bruce's letter is, for me, one of the strongest pieces of 
writing in the book, both for its expository effect, and for its direct address to future 
readers, not only of the bill of sale itself, but of the Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl: 
"My brain reeled as I read these lines. A gentleman near me said, 'It's true; I have seen 
the bill of sale.' 'The bill of sale I' Those words struck me like a blow. So I was sold at 
lastl A human being sold in the free city of New Yorkl The bill of sale is on record, and 
future generations will learn from it that women were articles of traffic in New York, 
late in the nineteenth century of the Christian religion. It may hereafter prove a useful 
document to antiquaries, who are .seeking to measure the progress of civilization in the 
United States. I well know the value of that bit of paper; but much as I love freedom, I 
do not like to look upon it. I am deeply grateful to the generous friend who procured it, 
but I despise the miscreant who demanded payment for what never rightfully belonged to 
him or his" (Jacobs, 200). 
33Jacobs has Mrs. Bruce explain, when Jacobs arrives home, that "I did not buy you for 
your services. I should have done just the same, if you had been going to sail for 
California tomorrow. I should, at least, have the satisfaction of knowing that you left me 
a free woman" (Jacobs, 200), and Jacobs repents of her initial reaction. In spite of this 
careful explanation, I still see the dichotomy between the vehemence of Jacobs' initial 
reaction and the humility of her final statement, a dichotomy which perhaps hides a 
space between worth examining. 
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clear that she does not want any obligations to Mrs. Bruce, suddenly "Love, 
duty, gratitude also bind me to her side. It is a privilege to serve her who 
pities my oppressed people" (italics mine). This servile language is a surprise 
after Jacobs has made it quite clear that the purchase of her freedom "would 
take from my sufferings the glory of triumph" (Jacobs, 199). 
The second to last paragraph contradicts itself for a reason. The 
paragraph begins with a sharp refusal to adopt "freedom" as an easy ending, 
rather implying that the word as a metaphor "is not saying a great deal," then 
moves through Jacobs' sense of non-fulfillment as a "free" woman and 
mother, and ends with a humble thank-you to Mrs Bruce for granting her 
"the inestimable boon of freedom." Jacobs suggests in this fracturing of 
consistency, expectation, and "truth," a space between the polarized 
understanding not only of black and white, but of slavery and freedom. 
Freedom is not only destabilized in its non-implicated position as the 
opposite of slavery, but it is also fundamentally questioned as an ontological 
possibility, just as the very existence of "race" as a viable idea is called into 
question by Jacobs' suggestion of the space between racial polarities. Jacobs' 
presentation of Northern complicity with Southern slavery, contrasted in the 
second to last paragraph with her servile relationship to Mrs. Bruce, serves to 
complicate and question "freedom," which, in its constructed fundamental 
difference from slavery, makes invisible the involvement of all Americans 
with slavery. This "vision" problematizes race relations by linking 
"freedom" with the conditions of slavery, thus implicating everyone, 
including "her who pities my oppressed people," in those conditions. 
.. .. .. 
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Similar to the way the text of Incidents tacks back and forth in order to 
suggest spaces between, so readings of the text have, across time, oscillated 
between polarities, establishing various and differing authorities which 
repolarize the destabilized elements in the text. Just as Jacobs' body could not 
deconstruct the conceptual polarity of race in spite of her body's physical 
manifestation of the hypocrisy of that construction, so the text has often been 
read as an unfractured representative of one pole, as in Blassingame's 
original insistence that the book is by a white woman, or as concealing 
somewhere beneath its fractured surface an "authentic" and unfractured 
Jacobs, as in Joanne M. Braxton's interpretation of Jacobs as the archetypical 
"outraged mother" figure. But as critic Hazel Carby insists, in writing about 
the conflicting ideologies of black and white womanhood under slavery, 
"stereotypes only appear to exist in isolation while actually depending on a 
nexus of figuration which' can be explained only in relation to each other" 
(Carby, 20). The desire to claim an authentic black experience from Incidents, 
or to take its ambiguous relationship to "white" language and forms as a sign 
of its inauthenticity, ignores the constructedness of "black" experience as 
opposite and separate from "white" experience. Jacobs' text does not contain 
an incongruous use of "white" language and genre forms by a "black" 
woman, or vice versa. It is an explosion of those forms from within, by 
someone whose body and text are, in very complicated ways, at the "nexus of 
[racial] figurations." 
The tension which results from the use of "white" language and 
"white" form has complicated readings of the text ever since it was written. If 
we see that tension as a reconstruction/deconstruction of the ambiguities and 
hypocrisies of the slave system itself, a system whose polarized ideologies of 
race and gender "appear to exist in isolation while actually depending on a 
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nexus of figurations which can be explained only in relation to each other," 
then the text's receptions begin to suggest as much if not more about the 
understandings and cultural constructions of the people reading the book as 
they do about the book itself. Acknowledging this, the reader becomes "free" 
to recognize his or her position as historically and racially situated. To not do 
this is to run the risk of reading the language and the form of the text as 
simply and as stereotypically as Jacobs' enslaved body was read in the 1830s 
and 40s. The racial blind spot, after all, has evolved along with American 
society and still polarizes American vision .. 
If recognizing one's own context is of utmost importance to the 
reading of Incidents, it becomes necessary to recognize, in addition to Jacobs' 
position as intermediary between her experience and her intended audience, 
the reader's cultural, racial and historical position as itself an interlocutor 
between text and understanding. The book begins with the word "reader," 
and continues throughout to address its audience directly, as in "But, 0, ye 
happy women, whose purity has been sheltered from childhood, who have 
been free to choose the objects of your affection, whose homes are protected by 
law, do not judge the poor desolate slave girl too severely!" (Jacobs, 54). In 
her plea, Jacobs makes it clear that the power of interpretation does not lie 
with the reader in isolation. She contextualizes her readers, begging of those 
for whom the laws, the interdictions, work, that they "do not judge ... too 
severely." The institution of "race" which creates the material and 
conceptual differences between Jacobs and her audience, although greatly 
altered by the passage of time and the resulting changes in society, are still, if 
differently, with us today.34 The history of the reception of Incidents is as 
34A. Leon Higgenbotham's epilogue helped me arrive at this thought. He writes of how 
"Shortly before Chief Justice Earl Warren died, I spoke with him in great detail about 
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much a history of black and white readers' relationships to the 
manifestations of the polarized construction of race in their particular 
America, as it is a history of readers' relationship to any single text. Thus, as I 
will attempt to show, the resulting interpretations of the text say a great deal 
about the cultural blind spots of the people reading it. Recognizing that my 
reading is profoundly subjective and that I am very much the product and 
mouthpiece of my own context,35 I would like, after examining three 
responses to Jacobs, to suggest that just as the existence of conceptual blind 
spots between the polarities which I see Jacobs as subtilely de constructing are 
perhaps what we can hope most clearly to "see" while reading the text, so the 
context of my own position in a history of receptions of Incidents is perhaps 
what I can best "see" or at least acknowledge. 
Published privately in December, 1860, Incidents did not enter the 
market at a profitable time. As Jean Fagan Yellin puts it, "as the nation 
moved toward civil war, yet another slave narrative seemed of minor 
importance" (Introduction to Incidents, xxiv). The book attracted some 
attention among white abolitionists, however, and in February, 1861, the 
my ten year research effort on the issue of colonial slavery. He responded: 'I would be 
especially interested in seeing you at this particular time because of a reappraisal of my 
own thinking concerning slavery -- not only what it meant in the past but the danger of 
what it will still mean to the future.' I concur with the concern expressed by Chief 
Justice Warren that the impact of our heritage of slave laws will continue to make itself 
felt into the future. For there is a nexus between the brutal centuries of colonial 
slavery and the racial polarization and anxieties of today. The poisonous legacy of 
legalized oppression based on the matter of color can never be adequately purged from 
our society if we act as if slave laws had never existed" (Higgenbotham, 391). 
35Although I am relegating my disclaimers to the end, I was never the less inspired by 
Judith Butler's introduction to "Imitation and Gender Insubordination," after which she 
writes, "I have begun with confessions of trepidation and a series of disclaimers, but 
perhaps it will become clear that disc/aiming, which is no simple activity, will be what 
I have to offer as a form of affirmative resistance to a certain regulatory operation of 
homophobia [or, in this case, the regulatory operation of traditional academic reading 
and writing which, as a matter of course, makes invisible and repolarizes blind spots]" 
(Butler, 15). 
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National Anti-Slavery Standard 36 ran a letter which, while it mainly 
compared Incidents to Uncle Tom's Cabin, also discussed the book's own 
merits, "approving its lack of sensationalism, and deploring its occasional 
moralizing" (Introduction to Incidents, xxiv) This, then, was one 
contemporary response to Incidents, written by a member (sex unidentified) 
of the text's originally intended audience, and addressed to more members of 
that audience. I have chosen to concentrate on it because, as a response 
published in the National Anti-Slavery Standard, it reached a wide 
abolitionist audience, and because it expresses a reading of the text which I 
find interesting given the text's manipulation of genre and convention for 
the benefit of exactly that audience: 
It is by no means an extreme picture of the delicate institution. 
The writer never suffers personal chastisement, and meets with 
white friends who comfort and assist. Her chief persecutor, a 
physician in good repute and practice, seems to have been 
subjected to all restraints that Southern public opinion can put 
on a professional man ... A few sentences in which the moral is 
rather oppressively displayed, might have been omitted with 
advantage. These, it is to be wished, Mrs. Child had felt herself 
authorized to expunge. " They are the strongest witnesses who 
leave the summing up to the judge, and the verdict to the jury. 
(Introduction to Incidents, xxiv). 
This reaction to Incidents is an example of the antebellum reader's 
insistence on the polarization of race, the polarization of North and South, 
and the control of "black" experience and expression by "white" interlocutors. 
The reader's blind spots, to the complicity of Northern whites in the 
36Lydia Maria Child, Jacobs' .editor, edited the National Anti-Slavery Standard from 
1841 to 1843. As "the first woman in America to edit a newspaper directed to an issue 
of public policy" (Yellin, 56), Child had constantly to battle "the charge that her sex 
would bias her work" (Yellin, 56). Yellin provides a very helpful discussion of the 
complicated relationship between feminism and abolitionism throughout Women and 
Sisters, and especially in relation to Child's tenure at the National Anti-Slavery 
Standard on pp. 56-60. 
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institution of slavery and to the constructedness of the polarity of race, are 
stalwartly maintained. The book is recommended because it is deemed 
palatable to its intended white audience. White people are not categorically · 
dismissed, and in fact, the reader can identify with "white friends who 
comfort and assist." Thus reading the book as safely mediated, the white 
reader does not have to acknowledge his or her complicity in the institution 
of slavery. 
That the book is described for what it doesn't do, rather than for what it 
does, and the enigmatic terms "delicate institution" and "personal 
chastisement," echo Incident's own carefUl maneuverings around what could 
and couldn't be said to polite white women. What, for example, does 
"personal chastisement" mean? Jacobs certainly suffers verbal abuse, and she 
is once struck down by Dr. Flint. Is the reader alluding to the fact that Jacobs is 
not raped by Dr. Flint?37 Equally enigmatic is the description of Dr. Flint's 
position in Southern society, which discusses the ways which he is restrained, 
something Jacobs never does, as opposed to how he is violently manipulative 
and abusive. The book is praised not for its representation of "the delicate 
institution," but for its representation of whites. 
The white reader, reassured, is then reminded of the mediating 
presence of Lydia Maria Child. What fault this writer finds, he or she blames 
not on Jacobs' skill as an author, but on Child's lack of control over the text. 
Did this writer mean by "the moral" those places where Jacobs condemns the 
institution of slavery? Or those places where Jacobs implicates the North in 
the institution of slavery? Or where Jacobs calls the white women of the 
North to action? Whichever of those moments of direct exhortation and 
371f so, "personal chastisement" is a very telling euphemism, chastisement carrying 
with it the implication of some misdemeanor. 
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undisguised intent this writer may be referring to, he or she effectively 
dis empowers those moments by transferring the "authority" of the text to 
Lydia Maria Child. This writer is not interested in "the moral." Rather he or 
she wishes that Child had taken a greater role as interlocutor between the text 
and the white readership. The excerpt concludes with the writer's opinion 
that "They are the strongest witnesses who leave the summing up the judge, 
and the verdict to the jury." Suffice it to say that in the Northern and 
Southern United (or disunited) States in 1861, judges and juries were 
comprised solely of white· men. Authority is thus transferred to Child and 
the readers, through a reference to the institutionalized arbiters who upheld 
and maintained the legal interdictions which naturalized white supremacy in 
the United States. Clearly this reader, by using the metaphor of the court, 
solidly maintains his or her blind spots to the constructedness of the 
polarized understanding of race. 
Having made a small impact in the early 1860's, Incidents quickly fell 
into obscurity, probably due to the emancipation of the slaves and the slow 
dissolution of the abolitionist movement. As Yellin relates, when the book 
was remembered, it was remembered confusedly: "Some thought it a 
narrative dictated by a fugitive slave, Jacobs, to Child; others thought it an 
antislavery novel that Child had written in the form of a slave narrative" 
(Introduction to Incidents, xxv). Thus, when John Blassingame discounted 
the "veracity" of Incidents in his influ.ential 1972 history, The Slave 
Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South, he was responding 
not only to what he saw in the text, but to a history of confused and 
ambivalent readings of it which had placed it partially if not wholly in the 
hands of a white writer. 
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The Slave Community was a very influential history of slavery, one of 
the first, as Blassingame himself notes, to "explore ... the life experiences of 
American slaves" (Blassingame, vii). He relied heavily upon slave 
narratives to determine "how blacks felt about the conditions under which 
they lived" (Blassingame, 228), but in order to research this, Blassingame had 
to confront the idea that "few men are able to tell the whole truth about 
themselves," and the question of whether or not any given narrative is 
"representative" and "reliable." Very concerned with the issue of authority 
and veracity, Blassingame provides a "Critical Essay on Sources" at the end of 
his book, in which he explains his methods of verification, and explains why 
two narratives, Aunt Sally: Or the Cross the Way to Freedom, and Incidents 
in the Life of a Slave Girl, do not stand up to his criteria.38 Although he has 
since reversed his opinion, in 1972 Blassingame maintained that "in spite of 
Lydia Maria Child's insistence that she had only revised the manuscript of 
Harriet Jacobs 'mainly for the purpose-of condensation and orderly 
arrangement,' the work is not credible" (Blassingame, 234). Where the 1861 
reader found Child's presence too diluted, Blassingame a century later finds 
the text too mediated: "In the first place, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl is 
too orderly; too many of the major characters meet providentially after years 
of separation .... Then, too, the story is too melodramatic: miscegenation 
and cruelty, outraged virtue, unrequited love, and planter licentiousness 
appear on practically every page" (Blassingame, 234). In addition to a blind 
spot regarding gender, Blassingame's blind spot polarizes the conventions of 
38Blassingame's methods are clearly sexist. Not only are the two discounted narratives 
by women, but Blassingame consistently refers to slaves as "he." The most glaring 
example of this that I found was the way in which he introduced one of the women's 
narratives: "In some of the fictional accounts, the major character may have been a real 
fugitive, but the narrative of his life is probably false. Aunt Sally: Or the Cross the 
Way to Freedom . .. is a good example of the type" (Blassingame, 233). 
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sentimentality and the conventions of slave narrative, which amounts to a 
polarization of truth and falsehood. He condemns the narrative for exactly 
those adoptions of the sentimental convention which made it palatable to its 
1861 white female audience, while acknowledging none of the complicated 
manipulations of that convention which suggest exactly the spaces between 
polarities which his reading is blind to, namely, the space between truth and 
fiction, authority and non-authority. The text emerges, still powerfully 
enigmatic, from between a reading by a Civil War era white reader who could 
accept nothing Jacobs said unmediated, and a reading by a 1972 black historian 
for whom the mediating genre choice spelled falsehood. 
In 1981 Jean Fagan Yellin was able, through the use of letters and 
meticulous historical research, to "authenticate Uacobs'] authorship" 
(Introduction to Incidents, xxv). Since that time the book has received 
enormous academic attention, to the extent that it was taught in three 
different classes at Oberlin just this semester.39 This official authentication, 
combined with a contemporary movement on the part of some black 
feminists to define an essence of black femaleness,40 prepared the ground for 
Joanne M. Braxton's 1986 Massachuse~ts Review article, "Harriet Jacobs' 
Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl: The Re"-Definition of the Slave Narrative 
Genre." In this article Braxton outlines what she sees as the distinctions 
between men's and women's slave narratives, establishing for black 
American women "a mystic sisterhood. .. we live our lives within a magic 
39These classes were: American Women's History, Black Women in America, and 
American Romanticism. 
40Th is is, of course, still a current issue in many feminisms, some defined as and/or 
defining themselves as "white," some defined as and/or defining themselves as "black." 
For a good discussion of the issues and problems in black feminist theory current in 
1986, see Hazel Carby's chapter, "Women's Era: Rethinking Black Feminist Theory," in 
Reconstructing Womanhood. This chapter speaks strongly against "essentialism," a 
"position" I align myself witb. 
) 
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circle, a realm of shared language, reference, and allusion within the veil of 
our blackness and our femaleness" (Braxton, 379). Braxton employs 
unfortunate and reductive stereotypes in order to place Harriet Jacobs in the 
position of the "outraged mother/' an archetype who, "With her hands on 
her hips and her head covered with a bandana" stands "at the core of our 
black and female experience, this American Amazon of African descent, 
dwelling in the moral and psychic wilderness of North America" (Braxton, 
380). The textual example Braxton uses to establish Jacobs' archetypal black 
motherhood, however, undermines her very assertion of that point. She 
writes, "The outraged mother resists her situation not so much on behalf of 
herself as on behalf of her children ... 'I knew the doom that awaited my fair 
baby in slavery, and I determined to save her from it, or perish in the 
attempt'" (Braxton,387). In this quote, intended to illustrate Jacobs' essential 
nature as a black woman, Jacobs specifically names her daughter's skin color, 
"fair," thus alluding to the heightened sexual commodification of light-
skinned slave women. Again, through one little word slipped in, Jacobs 
suggests the fallacy of the naturalizing myth of "race," which in antebellum 
American supposedly justified slave status based on an immutable polarity of 
skin color, but which was in fact a violently reinforced ontology of oppression 
founded on legal and linguistic interdictions. In my opinion, the quote 
Braxton chose points to the blind spot between the polarized construction of 
race, a blind spot Braxton herself reins'cribes in her article. 
And so I come to the momento! this thesis. Today, April 20th, 1993, I 
got on the elevator at Main Level, interrupting the conversation of three 
black women who then rode in silence with me up to the third floor. The 
elevator stopped and before the door opened, one of them said to another, or 
to me, "Someone had better erase that before the wrong person reads it." I 
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looked at the elevator wall as I walked out behind them. "Rodney King 
Deserved It" was scrawled in ballpoint pen next to the emergency stop switch. 
And I unlocked my scholar study and sat down at my computer to 
write the conclusion to a long academic paper about how the trope of "race," 
which is still violently enacted and reenacted in America, is handled by 
Harriet Jacobs and the readers of Incidents. Legal and linguistic interdictions. 
Spaces between. Blind spots. Suggestions. Myself, white, writing about 
Harriet Jacobs, black, writing. 
Who was the wrong person, if not them, if not me? Based on where 
this thesis has led me, I wonder if the four of us in that elevator weren't 
already tied together in a silence which at least for me was based on "race," on 
my fear of "race," my desire to situate myself on the "right" side of the 
polarities resulting from "race," my fears that all I do, or all I can do, is occupy 
the "wrong" pole, the oppressive, appropriative, racist pole. Didn't the 
writing on the wall tie us together in a polarity of identity based on "race?" 
Weren't we all readers, though very different readers, of "race," of the brutal 
re-enforcement of "race," and weren't we brutalized into polarized categories, 
not for the first time, but again, as we are, and as I know I unconsciously 
facilitate, through tinier brutalities many times a day? I do not mean to 
suggest that "white," because it is constantly repolarized over against "black" 
is therefore a sister in oppression. I mean that the violence, directed from 
"white" against "black" of "Rodney King Deserved It," given the legal history 
of the Rodney King beating and its aftermath, recalls present day legal 
interdictions as well as enacts linguistic interdictions which help construct 
and maintain a radically unbalanced and oppressive understanding of "race" 
in America. This institutionalized white supremacy, recreated constantly in 
American culture, makes it impossible for me, in reading and writing about 
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Incidents, to divorce myself from my context as a white woman. Incidents, 
after all, is not primarily about the ways, powerful or disturbing, that "black" 
and "white" cultures, informed as they are by "race", play themselves out 
independently of one another, but rather speaks from and to the violence and 
silencing which African Americans suffered in the antebellum United States 
when people came into contact as "black" and "white," polarized against and 
therefore defined in violent relation to one another. Given that history, and 
the history of racial interdictions in America since then, I can only read 
Incidents as a woman who is white, a white woman trying to see through the 
use of inter diction in the text, the blind spots in my culture and myself which 
reproduce "race" at every turn. 
But looking for my own blind spots is, as I wrote in a very different 
context many pages ago, an act of looking which is impossible, although 
perhaps it is all I can do, vigilantly, constantly. To try, vigilantly and 
constantly, to recognize the violent constructedness of the pole of "race" I 
occupy, and acknowledge my own complicity in that construction. And in 
doing so, I hope I become a woman who is white writing consciously about 
race. More explicitly, I hope I become ani other white woman reading 
Incidents not only to reach "a realizing sense of the condition of two millions 
of women at the South, still in bondage," but to reach some sort of 
understanding about myself personally as a "raced" American, and about my 
cultural, intellectual, economic and political circumstances as they affect and 
are implicated in the cultural, intellectual, economic and political 
circumstances of other, differently "raced" Americans. I hope that my 
attempts to recognize, to "see" where others have stood and where I stand in 
relation to Incidents, and how those positions have functioned and still 
function in the construction of "race" as a whole are, if not helpful to other 
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readers of IncidentsJ at least a step in a good direction for me personallYJ in 
my relationship to my positionJ responsibilityJ and future as an active and 
hopefully contributing white American woman. 
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